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Abstract 
 
Androcentric thinking assumes maleness to be normative, and attributes gender 
differences to females.   A content analysis of articles reporting gender differences 
published between 1965 and 2004 in four APA journals examined androcentric pronouns, 
explanations, and tables and graphs.    Few articles used generic masculine pronouns to 
refer to both women and men.  However, explanations of gender differences within 
articles that mentioned such differences in their abstracts and titles referenced attributes 
of women significantly more often than attributes of men.  Most tables and graphs 
depicting gender differences positioned males’ data before females’ data, except when 
gender differences among parents were concerned.  Psychologists have ceased to use 
male-centered pronouns, but female and male psychologists continue to report, explain, 
and depict gender differences in androcentric ways. 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
In her feminist classic, The Lenses of Gender, Sandra Bem (1993) described biological 
essentialism, gender polarization, and androcentrism as three cultural ‘lenses’ which 
distort both laypeople’s, and scientists’, perceptions of gender.   Within and beyond 
psychology there has been repeated concern that such lenses impact the ways that 
psychological differences between females and males are reported and interpreted. 
Debates have focused on gender polarization; the exaggeration of gender differences 
(Baumeister, 1988; Favreau, 1997; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990; Hyde, 2005; 
Kitzinger, 1994; McHugh, Koeske, & Frieze, 1986; Mednick, 1989), and on biological 
essentialism; the premature attribution of gender differences to immutable biological 
factors (e.g., Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004; Mahalingam, 2003; Martin & Parker, 1995; 
McHugh, Koeske, & Frieze, 1986).   The current article aims to call attention to the third 
lens of androcentrism.  
  Following Bem (1993) we define androcentrism as the implicit conflation of 
maleness with humanity and the consequent attribution of gender differences to females, 
often to women’s disadvantage.   Below, we review psychological evidence on 
androcentric biases to motivate the hypothesis that psychological research also constructs 
gender differences through this cultural lens.  Previous research on androcentrism has 
focused on verbal measures, but we argue that androcentrism is also evidenced by 
visuospatial representations of group differences.  We report a content analysis 
examining verbal and visuospatial representations of gender differences in forty years of 
psychological research, and use our findings to reframe debates about the way that we 
psychologists report gender differences, and the influence of cultural values on scientific 
thinking within our discipline.   
Psychological Studies of Androcentric Thinking 
 The first component of androcentric thinking is the conflation of males with the 
norm (Bem, 1993; Silveira, 1980).  Psychological evidence of such conflation abounds.  
Men are taken as the default for several social categories  (Stroessner, 1996; Zárate & 
Smith, 1990).  Judgements about ‘men’ and ‘people’ are more similar than judgments 
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about ‘women’ and ‘people’ in regard to stereotypes of national groups (Eagly & Kite, 
1986), mental health standards (Broverman et al., 1970), and attitudes toward sexual 
minorities (Black & Stevenson, 1984).  When prompted to think of ‘famous people’ 
people call men to mind more often than women, and men particularly show this bias 
(Moyer, 1996; Stahlberg, Sczensny, & Braun, 2001).  Female and male children and 
adults almost always attribute maleness to ostensibly genderless soft toys, even when 
their conversation partners refer to the toy as ‘she’ (Lambdin et al., 2003).   Thus, in the 
absence of specific information about their gender social categories appear to be 
implicitly represented as male far more often than they are implicitly represented as 
female. 
 Such androcentic thinking is supported by the use of masculine generic pronouns 
to refer to individuals and groups.  ‘He’ and ‘she’ are not equivalent terms in the English 
language.1 ‘He’ is the eleventh most commonly used English word, but ‘she’ is only the 
forty-sixth most commonly used word (Bragg, 2003; p. p.7).  One reason that ‘he’ is 
more commonly used is that it also functions as a generic term to refer to persons of 
unknown gender.  While the generic ‘he’ is sometimes described as a ‘natural’ use of 
English, its usage is the result of deliberate reforms by proscriptive grammarians in past 
centuries who presumed the superiority of males (Bodine, 1975).  Although it would be 
unthinkable to conflate humanity with Whiteness in the way that it is routinely conflated 
with maleness (Hofstadter, 1985), such androcentric language is not recognized as sexist 
by all (Swim, Mallett, & Stangor, 2004).  Men are less likely to find such androcentric 
language sexist, particularly those who are more sexist themselves (Parks & Robertson, 
2004).  Yet androcentric pronouns have implications for the ways that we think about 
women and men. Children give lower estimates for a female worker’s performance when 
workers are described as ‘he’ rather than ‘they,’ ‘he or she,’ or ‘she’ (Hyde, 1984).  Even 
among those adults who understand that ‘he’ has a generic meaning, the pronoun prompts 
mental imagery of males more than females (e.g., Gastil, 1990; Hamilton, 1988, 1991; 
Ng,1990).   
According to Bem (1993), the tendency to take men as the default gender leads to 
a second bias; the attribution of gender differences to women’s nature more than to men’s 
nature.  This may occur because of a more general tendency to attribute inter-group 
differences to those groups who are not considered to be the default for the larger social 
category.   Indeed, not only are gender differences attributed to women more than to men 
(Miller, Taylor & Buck, 1991), but sexual orientation differences are attributed to 
lesbians and gay men more than to heterosexuals (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, 2004), and 
race differences are attributed to Blacks more than to Whites (Pratto, Hegarty, & 
Korchmaros, in press; see also Devos & Banaji, 2005).  Such biases evidence the effects 
of exemplar-based mental representations called category norms (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986) which are constructed on-line, most often from prototypical exemplars of the 
category.  Category norms make implicit the distinctive attributes of included exemplars, 
and render salient the distinctive attributes of excluded exemplars (see also Pratto, 
Korchmaros, & Hegarty, in press).  As the theory predicts, within social categories for 
which lower power groups are more typical, explanations of inter-group differences do 
not take those groups as ‘the effect to be explained.’  Rather, gender differences among 
elementary school teachers are understood to be about men as much as they are about 
women (Miller et al., 1991, Experiment 3), and sexual orientation differences among men 
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living with HIV/AIDS are understood to be about straight men as much as they are about 
gay men (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, Experiment 2).   
Androcentric Thinking in Science 
These findings about the androcentric thinking of ‘just plain folks’ (Lave, 1988) 
raise the question of whether psychologists similarly take males as the default when 
constructing the meaning of gender differences that emerge in their research.  Because 
psychology is a science, it might be assumed to be immune to the influence of such 
cultural biases as androcentrism. However, both Kuhn’s (1970) notion of the ‘paradigm’ 
and Foucault’s (1994) notion of the ‘episteme’ suggest that knowledge within the 
sciences depends on webs of historically particular implicit assumptions.  Popper (1959, 
p. 37) demarcated science from other forms of knowledge on the basis of its fasfiability, 
but specified that the falsifiability of a theory was determined by social agreement within 
any given scientific community.2   In other words, despite their differences, the major 
philosophers of science of the twentieth century allow for systems of scientific thought to 
contain implicit assumptions that originate in scientists’ shared cultural understandings 
rather than the normative procedures of scientific inference and deduction.  Where the 
broader culture influences a scientific community, the interpretive practices of scientists 
and non-scientists are likely to be similar.  The present research examines whether 
psychologists, like the participants in the experiments described above, implicitly assume 
that empirical gender differences show how women differ from men more than they show 
how men differ from women.   
Our research examined psychological writing over the period 1965-2004.  During 
this forty year period, feminist ideas became institutionalized in psychology (see Tiefer, 
1991), and three effects of feminism’s influence on psychology are particularly relevant 
to the current research.  First, males ceased to be chronically overrepresented as authors 
of, and participants in, research studies (Gannon et al., 1991).  Second, feminist 
psychology publications such as Psychology of Women Quarterly, Sex Roles and 
Feminism & Psychology were founded which emphasized feminist values. Third, 
research psychologists acknowledged that they were vulnerable to androcentric biases 
and took steps to mitigate them.  The American Psychological Association explicitly 
prohibited use of the generic ‘he,’ on the grounds that it was androcentric (e.g., APA 
Publication Manual Task Force, 1977), and research published since that time has 
complied with this directive (Gannon et al., 1992).    
While these changes in psychologists’ criteria of merit for research on gender 
were historic, we hypothesized that they had not completely eradicated androcentrism in 
psychology, and for three reasons.  First, qualitative reviews have suggested that feminist 
research in psychology has tended to undo negative evaluations of women in traditional 
theories more often than undo the position of males as the standard of comparison within 
those theories (e.g., Crawford and Marecek, 1989; Mednick, 1989; Walsh, 1989).  
Second, the move to forbid the use of the generic ‘he’ met with considerable resistance 
(see Martyna, 1980 for a review and Hofstadter, 1985 for a satirical view of this debate).  
Androcentric practices may die hard among scientists because they are habitual for many 
of us, and are not recognized as being biases by all of us.  Third, debates about the 
generic ‘he’ failed to address the androcentric tendency to explain differences as being 
about women rather than about men. Hegarty and Pratto (2001) showed that at least one 
team of scientific authors positioned heterosexuals and White people as ‘the norm’ and 
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gay/lesbian and Black people as ‘the effects to be explained’ in spite of their awareness 
that so doing constituted a form of bias. Psychologists may be vulnerable to androcentric 
biases in their explanatory practices even if they recognize that such biases exist and 
consider them to be problematic.  Successful attempts to extinguish the generic ‘he’ from 
academic writing do not necessarily disrupt androcentric thoughts (Prentice, 1994).   
Thus, we predicted that while the use of the generic ‘he’ would no longer be 
visible in the psychological literature, an androcentric tendency to explain gender 
difference findings as being about women rather than men would still be evident.  Our 
study included a third measure of androcentrism; we examined visuospatial constructions 
of gender differences.   In science, males can be visually presented as the norm for 
humanity, as in successive editions of Grays Anatomy where most of the ‘human’ bodies 
have been transparently male (Petersen, 1998).  We examined representations of gender 
differences in tables and graphs for evidence of androcentrism.  Such visuospatial 
displays regularly accompany scientific text and serve to clarify its meaning (Shah & 
Hoeffner, 2002).  However, the information in visuospatial displays is encoded 
sequentially, and English language speakers encode spatial information from top to 
bottom (Clark & Chase, 1972) and from left to right (Chatterjee, 2001; Maass & Russo, 
2003; Spalek & Hammad, 2005; Tversky, Kugelman, & Winter, 1991).  We predicted 
that androcentrism would be evidenced by visuospatial displays that positioned data 
about men to the left of, or above, data about women.  Displays that positioned data about 
men underneath, or to the right of, data about women were defined as gynocentric.  
 Finally, as our work was informed by norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), 
we assumed that androcentric biases were not consequences of negative beliefs about 
women, but rather resulted from shared cognitive structures that positioned men as more 
typical members of the category ‘human’ than were women.   Within categories where 
women are more typical, such effects were predicted to be absent or reversed.   
Psychologists have long taken mothers to be the preferred participants in research on 
parenting (Burman, 1994; Gannon, 1998).   Accordingly, we predicted that androcentric 
biases would be absent or reversed when psychologists reported gender differences 
among parents.  
 
Method 
 
 We systematically sampled articles over the period from 1965 to 2004 from four 
APA journals; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP), Developmental 
Psychology (DP), Journal of Abnormal Psychology (JAP), and Psychology of Women 
Quarterly (PWQ).   PWQ began publication in 1976, but it was included to assess 
whether androcentrism characterized feminist research as well as ‘mainstream’ non-
feminist research on gender differences.  One issue per year of publication of each 
journal was selected at random.  Every article within that issue that reported original 
empirical data was included in the corpus.   Review articles, commentaries, and meta-
analyses were excluded.   This sampling procedure produced a corpus of 1859 articles.  
We recorded each article’s year and journal of publication.  Where the information was 
available, we also recorded the first author’s gender, the proportion of male and female 
authors, and the proportion of male and female participants in the reported empirical 
studies.   
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Twenty-one percent of the articles reported one or more empirical gender 
difference (N = 388). We categorized this smaller set of articles into three groups 
according to the salience accorded to the gender differences reported.  High salience 
articles mentioned gender differences in their titles, medium salience articles mentioned 
gender differences in their abstracts but not in their titles, and low salience articles did not 
mention gender differences in either their titles or abstracts. Several articles in DP 
included both parents and children as study participants. For such articles, we treated 
children as the principal participants of these studies and reports of gender differences 
among parents were analyzed separately.  This allowed a test of whether gender 
differences were reported similarly between ‘females and males’ and ‘fathers and 
mothers’.  
We examined the 388 articles for evidence of three types of androcentrism.  First, 
we coded each article for the use of the generic ‘he’ anywhere in its text.  Second, we 
examined descriptions and explanations of the observed gender differences within the 
‘results’ and ‘discussion’ section, or sections, of each article.   Following Miller et al. 
(1991), we counted all references to attributes of males and to attributes of females.  We 
defined androcentrism as the tendency to describe and explain gender differences with 
reference to women’s attributes.   Each sentence clause that took a gender group as its 
subject was counted as a reference to that gender.  For example, “Boys were significantly 
more overtly aggressive than girls” was coded as a reference to males (see Crick, Casas, 
& Mosher, 1997; p.583).    Finally, we counted the number of visuospatial displays of 
gender differences that presented data about each gender first.   The second author 
completed all coding.   
 
Results 
 
Representation of Male and Female Authors and Participants  
 
 We first examined the inclusion of female and male authors and study participants 
in the articles we sampled.  A 4 x 4 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted with 
decade of publication (1965-1974 vs. 1975-1984 vs. 1985-1994 vs. 1995-2004) and 
journal (JPSP vs. DP vs. JAP vs. PWQ) as independent variables, and the first author’s 
gender as the dependent variables.  We dummy coded female authors as ‘1’ and male 
authors as ‘0’ such that higher numbers referred to a greater representation of female 
authors.3   Significant main effects of decade of publication, F(3, 1822)=22.94, p<.001, 
η
2
=.04, journal of publication, F(3, 1822)=105.16, p<.001, η2=.15, and an interaction, F 
(8, 1822) = 3.57, p<.001, η2= .02, were observed.  While male authors were initially 
vastly overrepresented, more equal representation emerged with time.  Gender 
representation changed most markedly between the first two decades of the study for two 
reasons; female authors became better represented within DP, JAP, and JPSP, and  PWQ 
began publication in the second decade under study.  Male authors were consistently 
underrepresented in PWQ  (see Table 1).4    
Next we examined the inclusion of female and male study participants.  A similar 
4 x 4 ANOVA was conducted using the proportion of male participants in the reported 
studies as the dependent variable.  Significant main effects of decade, F (3, 1441) = 
24.41, p<.001, η2= .05, and journal, F (3, 1441) = 56.02, p<.001, η2= .10, and an 
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interaction, F (8, 1441) = 3.60, p<.001, η2= .02, were observed.  Male participants were 
overrepresented in earlier studies, but underrepresented in later studies.  This occurred 
both because studies reported in JPSP and JAP came to include fewer male participants 
over time, and because female participants were consistently overrepresented in studies 
reported in PWQ (see Table 2).  Thus within the larger corpus of articles there was 
consistent evidence that psychological research ceased to over-represent males, both as 
study participants and as study authors over the last forty years.  This pattern is consistent 
with past reviews of this literature (see Gannon et al., 1992).  To examine androcentrism 
we next turned to the smaller corpus of 388 articles that reported gender differences. 
_______________________________________________________________________
Table 1: Proportion of Female First Authors by Publication and Decade (Sample Size in 
Parentheses).  
             
Journal 1965-1974 1975-1984 1985-1994 1995-2004 Total  
JPSP  .15a  (140) .24a  (141) .26a  (163) .26a  (141)      .23  (585) 
JAP  .12a  (121) .28b (92) .34b  (147) .30b (130) .27  (490) 
DP  .30a  (107) .50b  (129) .53b  (166) .75c  (150)     .54  (552) 
PWQ    .78a  (63) .83a (75) .86a (72)     .82  (210) 
All Journals .18  (368) .41  (425) .48  (551) .51  (493) .49 (1837) 
 
Note: Twenty-two articles were excluded because the first authors’ gender was ambiguous.   
Means within each row which do not share a superscript differ significantly (Tukey’s HSD, α = 
.05).   
________________________________________________________________________  
 
Androcentric Pronoun Use  
 
 Androcentric pronoun use was rare within the articles reporting gender 
differences.  Only thirty of the 388 articles (i.e., 7.7%) used the generic ‘he.’  Articles 
that used the generic ‘he’ were dummy coded as‘1’ and those that did not were dummy 
coded as ‘0’.  A 4x4x3x2 ANOVA with decade, publication, salience of gender 
differences (high vs. medium vs. low), and first author’s gender as independent variables 
revealed only an effect of decade on androcentric pronoun use, F (3, 355) = 21.83, p 
<.001, η2= .16.   Post hoc tests revealed that a greater proportion of articles used the 
generic ‘he’ during the first decade than the second decade (Ms = .28, .10 respectively).  
No articles published after 1985 used the generic ‘he’.  Two articles each contained one 
use each of ‘she’ as a generic pronoun.  Psychologists no longer use androcentric 
pronouns in their research publications (c.f., APA Publication Manual Task Force, 1977; 
Gannon et al., 1992).   
 
Verbal Descriptions and Explanations of Gender Differences  
 
 Next we examined if empirical gender differences were described and explained 
as being about women or about men.  A 4x4x3x2x2 ANOVA was conducted with 
decade, journal, salience of gender differences, and first author’s gender as within-
subjects factors, and the gender group referenced (females vs. males) as a within-subjects 
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factor. Females’ attributes were referenced more often than males’ attributes, F (1, 300) = 
11.43, p=.001, η2= .04 (Ms = 9.57, 7.23 respectively), evidencing androcentrism.  A 
significant main effect of the salience of gender differences was also observed.  Females’ 
and males’ attributes were referenced most often in articles that made gender differences 
highly salient (M = 27.73), significantly less in medium salience articles (M = 21.46), and 
significantly less again in low salience articles (M = 9.25).  No other main effects were 
significant.  Female and male psychologists writing across the decades in different 
journals all rendered men and boys the norm for comparison, and women and girls ‘the 
effect to be explained,’ to much the same degree.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2: Proportion of Male Study Participants by Publication and Decade (Sample Size 
in Parentheses).  
             
Decade  1965-1974 1975-1984 1985-1994 1995-2004 Total  
     JPSP  .64a (100) .47b (111) .44 b (104) .41 b (101) .49 (416) 
     JAP  .68a (86) .57b (76) .49b (132) .49b (121) .54 (415) 
     DP   .53a (95) .50a (107) .51a (109) .51a (114) .51 (425) 
     PWQ  -  .31a (58) .24ab (70) .16b (72) .23 (200) 
    Total  .62 (281) .48  (352)  .44 (415)  .41 (408) .47 (1456) 
 
Note: Four hundred and three articles were excluded as the proportion of male and female 
participants was ambiguous.   Means within each row which do not share a superscript differ 
significantly (Tukey’s HSD, α = .05).   
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 A marginally significant interaction between the gender group referenced and the 
salience accorded to gender differences was also observed, F (2, 300) = 2.93, p < .06, η2= 
.02.  Post hoc tests showed that there were equal numbers of references to females and 
males in low salience articles.  However, in medium and high salience articles, there were 
significantly more references to females that to males.  In other words, among the articles 
that reported gender differences, only those that mentioned those differences in their 
abstracts or titles contained large numbers of references to the attributes of gender groups 
and particularly to attributes of women and girls (see Figure 1).    
 
Visuospatial Displays of Gender Differences 
 
 Finally, we examined visuospatial displays of gender differences.  Two hundred 
and eighty-two of the 388 articles that reported gender differences (i.e., 72.7%) included 
at least one table or graph that visually represented gender differences.  On average, each 
of these 282 articles included  2.35 such visuospatial displays. We calculated the 
proportion of androcentric and gynocentric visuospatial displays within each article.  A 
far greater proportion of these were androcentric than were gynocentric (Ms= .74, .26), t 
(281) = 29.87, p <.001.  Again this androcentric pattern was quite consistent across the 
articles sampled.  A 4x3x2x2 ANOVA was conducted with decade, publication, the 
salience of gender differences, and first author’s gender as within-subjects factors, and 
the proportion of androcentric visuospatial displays as the dependent variable.  Only a 
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main effect of publication was observed, F (3, 203) = 5.13, p <.01, η2= .07.   Post hoc 
tests showed that articles in PWQ and JPSP had fewer androcentric visuospatial displays 
(M = .63, .68 respectively) than articles in DP (M = .87).  Proportions of androcentric 
visuospatial displays in JAP articles did not differ significantly from the means for other 
journals (Ms = .72).   However, a significant majority of visuospatial displays within the 
articles sampled from each of the four journals were androcentric, all t > 2.14, all p<.005.   
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 1: Mean Number of References to Females and Males by Salience of Gender  
Differences in Articles’ Text 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Gender Differences Among Parents 
 
 Within the entire corpus, only twenty articles reported gender differences between 
mothers and fathers.   The text of these articles’ ‘results’ and ‘discussion’ sections were 
coded as before.  These contained an equal number of references to mothers and fathers, t 
< 1, (Ms = 11.55, 11.30).  Each article contained an average of 1.85 visuospatial displays 
of gender differences between parents.  In contrast to the displays in the main corpus, 
many more of these visuospatial displays were gynocentric than were androcentric (Ms= 
.81, .19), t (17) = 3.48, p <.01.  Thus, verbal androcentrism was not evidenced but 
visuospatial gynocentrism was evidenced in the construction of psychological gender 
differences among parents.  
 
Discussion 
 
 This content analysis shows both stability and change in the effects of 
androcentrism on psychologists’ constructions of gender differences.  More participants 
in, and authors of, psychological studies are female than in previous decades, and 
research psychologists have long since extinguished the generic ‘he’ from their 
vocabulary.  Yet, other androcentric biases remain; explanations of gender differences 
focus on women more than on men and visuospatial displays position men first and 
women second.  Explanations of gender differences among parents focus equally on 
mothers and fathers, and visuospatial displays of such differences position mothers first 
and fathers second.   
 Were the articles that we sampled representative of the psychological literature in 
general?  Our corpus included articles from four APA publications that publish high 
quality research, and we deliberately focused on these journals to yield a large number of 
articles that reported gender differences.   To assess the representativeness of these 
findings, we examined a broader range of journals in less depth.  We used the database 
Psychinfo to search for articles published between 1965 and 2004 that positioned one 
gender group (e.g., women) as the background comparison for the other gender group 
(e.g., men) with the phrases ‘less than’ and ‘more than’.   For example, we searched for 
articles whose abstracts contained both the phrase ‘less than women’ and the word ‘men’ 
and those that contained both the phrase ‘less than men’ and the word ‘women.’   As 
Table 3 shows, psychologists’ abstracts have been more likely to position females as 
‘more than’ or ‘less than’ males, than they are to position males as ‘more than’ or ‘less 
than’ females.  Furthermore, this asymmetry is not observed with regard to gender 
differences among parents. Note also that ‘more than’ constructions were vastly preferred 
over ‘less than’ constructions of differences (Clark, 1969; see also Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001).  Thus, androcentric constructions of gender differences appear to be the norm 
beyond the four journals that we examined in depth; males are taken as the reference 
point for gender difference comparisons, except where women are the more typical 
group.   These findings prompt questions about psychologists’ individual cognitive 
processes and the ‘social construction’ of knowledge among scientists.   
Cognitive Explanations  
These findings suggest that psychologists behave very much like other kinds of 
people in at least three ways.   First, whether women and men happen to be research 
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psychologists or experimental participants, they focus typically explanations of gender 
differences on females, except where females are more typical of the overarching 
category (e.g., Miller et al., 1991).  However, psychologists’ explanations are less 
asymmetric than are experimental participants’s explanations; participants typically 
produce almost three times as many references to atypical groups as to typical groups 
(see Pratto, Hegarty & Korchmaros, in press).  Less extreme bias was observed here. 
Second, psychologists’ visuospatial representations of gender differences 
overwhelmingly positioned men first, except where parents were being depicted.  Again, 
psychologists and experimental participants appear to be similar.  In a recent experiment, 
we found undergraduates to prefer to graph relations between typical and atypical 
members of natural and social categories by positioning the more typical entity first 
(Hegarty & Ungar, 2006).   In our experiment, as in the research reported here, data about 
males were displayed before data about females about 75% of the time.  It is known that 
real world knowledge affects the interpretation and recall of the information in graphs 
(see Shah & Hoeffner, 2002 for a review), and that graph format can subtly cue 
information about the relationships being displayed (Shah, Mayer, & Hegarty, 1999; 
Zachs & Tversky, 1999).  Future research should examine whether people expect graphs 
to depict more typical entities first, and whether the tendency to display gender 
differences in this way generalizes to other social cateogries.   
Third, the lack of any moderation of these findings by the year of the published 
study suggests that androcentric representations of gender differences have not been 
affected by the explicit proscription against the generic ‘he.’  Again, psychologists appear 
akin to other people; extinguishing the use of ‘he’ does not undo other forms of 
androcentric thinking (Prentice, 1994).   
Social Constructionist Explanations 
While cognitive explanations of these findings are necessary, they may be 
incomplete if they overlook the social processes through which knowledge about social 
categories is constructed in interaction (c.f., Antaki, 1981; Crawford, 1995; Edwards & 
Potter, 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).   Social constructionist and cognitive 
explanations of persistent behaviour patterns are not mutually incompatible; both 
perspectives emphasize that people are constructive meaning-makers, and neither 
perspective necessarily assumes that scientific meaning making is beyond cultural 
influence (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002).  Social constructionism directs attention towards the 
ways that the rhetorical demands of situations affect the kinds of discourse that is 
produced (Billig, 1987).  When scientists submit papers for publication, there is a 
rhetorical demand to show that new findings are being demonstrated.  Thus, in a field 
where male participants have been the norm, data about females may be ‘new’ and data 
about males may be ‘given’ information (Clark & Haviland, 1977).   Indeed, when people 
generalize from one group to another, they often take their own guesses about the second 
group as ‘the effect to be explained’ (Hegarty & Chrysochoou, 2005).   
However, our results show that women and girls have been represented as study 
participants for some time.  Consequently,  some process other than statistical 
underrepresentation appears to maintain androcentrism in psychology.  It is possible that 
androcentric psychological theories may play a role (Bem, 1993).  In addition to 
explaining atypical groups, people tend to focus explanations on atypical events 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kanazawa, 1992), and models which conflate men with the 
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norm will continually position women’s and girls’ behaviour as surprising.  Freud (1925, 
p. 249) admitted that psychoanalysts ‘have been in the habit of taking as the subject of 
our investigations the male child’ prior to explaining gender differences in terms of penis 
envy.   Models of human evolution often presume that men’s activities, such as hunting 
and warfare, to have spurred on the development of the species (Fedigan, 1986).  
Androcentrism in cognitive psychology appears less obvious.  However, Oyama (2000) 
notes that the cognitive metaphor of ‘mental programming’ presumes a humulculus 
programmer who programmes the mind, and we are likely to call to mind a male, rather 
than a female, programmer to instantiate our understanding of this metaphor.   Such 
theoretical choices as these are only partially determined by data, and they may reflect 
and support androcentric thinking in psychology by positioning men’s and boy’s 
behaviour as ordinary, and girls’ and women’s behaviour as exceptional and noteworthy.   
Does Androcentrism Matter? 
 Taken on their own, our findings demonstrate that androcentric constructions of 
gender differences are prevalent, but not that they are harmful.  However, gender 
difference research can reify stereotypes, particularly when attributed to biological 
factors (Brescoll and LaFrance, 2004, see also Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, 2004; Hoffman & 
Hurst, 1990; Martin & Parker, 1995).  Claims about empirical gender differences can also 
create stereotype threat effects, and produce the very gender differences they describe 
(Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele, 1997).  Where androcentrism is systematic, as in 
psychology, reports of ‘gender differences’ are not simply about ‘gender’; they are 
systematically about women and girls more than they are about men and boys.  As a 
result, it is not ‘gender stereotypes’ but stereotypes of women and girls that we risk 
reifying when we report empirical differences.  Thus, psychologists may contribute to the 
degree to which ‘women have gender, and blacks have race more than men and whites 
respectively do’ (Fiske, 1998, p. 366).   
Explanation is a constructive process (Asch & Zukier, 1986; Kunda, Miller, & 
Claire, 1990), and people can come to belief their own explanations of social science 
data, even if the relevant data have been debunked (Anderson & Sechler, 1986).  As a 
result of focusing explanations on atypical groups such as women, lesbians and gay men, 
ethnic minorities and others, people of all identities may form more rigid stereotypes 
about such groups.  Indeed, people do tend to hold more essentialist beliefs about low 
status groups than about high status groups (Haslam, Rothchild, & Ernst, 2000).   
When it goes without saying that boys and men are the default groups against 
which girls and women are to be compared, male privilege may also be reified.  Norms 
are communicated more by what goes unspoken and taken for granted in discourse, rather 
than that which is explicitly stated (Miller & Prentice, 1996).   This appears to be the case 
in regard to who becomes the ‘normative’ participant in psychological research also.  
Historically, as experimental psychology research increasingly focused on 
undergraduates, participants’ identities as undergraduates became mentioned less often 
in research articles, while other participants’ identities continued to be designated 
(Danziger, 1990).  Scholarship on the privilege enjoyed by Whites (e.g.,  Devos & 
Banaji, 2005; Dyer, 1997;  Fine, Weis, Powell, & Wong, 1997; Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 
2002; Macintosh, 1998; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005), men (Bem, 1993; De 
Beauvoir, 1949 Edley & Wetherell, 1995), English-language speakers (Hill, 1999) and 
heterosexuals (Bricknell, 2000; Hegarty, Pratto, & Lemieux, 2004; Sedgwick, 1990) all 
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call attention to the low salience of group identity as a critical component of the 
phenomenology of privilege.  Psychologists’ unintentional androcentrism may contribute 
to the perpetuation of male privilege.   
Concluding Thoughts 
We will conclude with some thoughts on how our research reframes 
‘metatheoretical’ debates about the psychology of gender (see Willig, 1991).  The 
androcentric practices described here provide a new vantage point from which to view 
debates about the science and politics of comparing women and men.  In the past, 
psychologists have been enjoined to avoid exaggerating gender differences (Baumeister, 
1988; Favreau, 1997; McHugh, Koeske, & Frieze, 1986; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990), 
to report similarities and small differences (Rothblum, 1988), to report empirical 
differences as accurately as possible (Eagly, 1995), and to trust in the value neutrality of 
a ‘free marketplace of ideas’ (Scarr, 1988).    
As often happens in psychology, all sides in this debate express important truths 
(see McGuire, 1973).  We agree with Eagly (1995) and Scarr (1988) that psychologists 
have a responsibility to report gender similarities and differences as accurately as 
possible.  To do otherwise would misrepresent our best knowledge about gender, and 
reduce public confidence in psychological science.  However, our research is consistent 
with postmodernist arguments that psychology can be characterized by both ‘beta bias,’ 
by which women are ignored, and ‘alpha bias,’ by which gender differences are 
exaggerated (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990). Empirical observation of gender 
differences can be described and explained in myriad ways, and cultural biases - such as 
androcentrism - can determine which kinds of constructions of gender differences are 
transacted within scientific communities.   
 
Notes 
 
1. Third person pronouns afford androcentrism differently in different languages.  In 
contrast to English, Romance languages (such as Romanian, French, Spanish) 
specify gender in both the plural and singular third person pronoun.  For mixed-
sex groups, the third person plural masculine pronoun is used in all romance 
languages.  In contrast, Finno-Ungric languages (such as Turkish, Finnish, and 
Hungarian) do not specify gender in either the singular or plural third person 
pronoun.  
2. As my interpretation of Popper’s work goes against the grain of much social and 
cognitive psychology which uses Popper’s criterion of falsification as a normative 
standard against which the constructive activities of participants are judged (e.g., 
Wason, 1960; Snyder & Swann, 1978), it is well to remember how specific 
Popper (1959, p. 37) was on this point.    “My criterion of demarcation will 
accordingly have to be regarded as a proposal for an agreement or convention.  
As to the suitability of any such convention opinions may differ; and a reasonable 
discussion of these questions is only possible between parties having some 
purpose in common.  The choice of that purpose must, of course, be ultimately a 
matter of decision, going beyond rational argument (emphasis in original). 
3. All post-hoc tests in the paper are Tukey’s HSD (α = .05).   
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4. To check that these conclusions were not biased by focusing on the gender of first 
authors rather than on all study authors, we calculated the proportion of female 
and male authors of each article and repeated the analysis.  Similar conclusions 
were reached.  The proportions of authors of each article who were female 
increased across the four decades of the study (Ms = .19, .43, .45, .49 
respectively) and varied across the four journals (Ms = .27 for both JPSP and 
JAP, .53 for DP and .77 for PWQ).   
 
Author Note 
 
Acknowledgment: We thank Jean Portman for library assistance, and James Cutting, 
Alice Eagly, and Mary Hegarty for comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.  
Correspondence should be addressed to Peter Hegarty, SPERI, Department of 
Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom, 
p.hegarty@surrey.ac.uk, +44 (0) 1483 686898.   
 
References 
 
APA Publication Manual Task Force (1977).  Guidelines for non-sexist language in
 APA journals: Publication Manual change sheet 2.  American Psychologist,
 32,  498-494.  
Anderson, C.A., & Sechler, E.S. (1986).  Effects of explanation and  
 counterexplanation on the development and use of social theories.  Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 24-34.  
Antaki, C. (Ed.).  (1981).  The psychology of ordinary explanations of social behaviour.  
London: Academic Press.  
Asch, S.E. & Zukier, H. (1984).  Thinking about persons.  Journal of Personality and 
 Social Psychology, 46, 1230-1240.  
Augustinos, M., & Walker, I. (1995).  Social cognition: An integrated introduction.  
London: Sage.  
Baumeister, R. F. (1988).  Should we stop studying sex differences altogether?  
American Psychologist, 43, 1092-1095. 
Bem, S. (1993).  The lenses of gender: Transforming the debate on sexual inequality.   
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
Billig, M. (1987).  Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology.
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Black, K.N. & Stevenson, M.R. (1984).  The relationship of self-reported sex-role
 characteristics and attitudes toward homosexuality.  Journal of Homosexuality,
 10, 83-93.  
Bodine, A. (1975).  Androcentrism in prescriptive grammar. Language in Society, 4, 
 129-146. 
Bragg, M. (2003).  The adventure of English: The biography of a language.  London:
 Hodder and Stoughton 
Bricknell, C. (2000). Heroes and invaders: Gay and lesbian pride parades and the
 public/private distinction in New Zealand media accounts. Gender, Place, and
 Culture, 7, 163-178. 
14 
Brescoll, V. & LaFrance, M. (2004). The correlates and consequences of newspaper  
 reports of research on sex differences.  Psychological Science, 15,  515-520. 
Broverman, I.K., Broverman, D.M., Clarkson, F.E., Rosenkrantz, P.S., & Vogel, S.R.  
(1970).  Sex-role stereotypes and clinical judgments of mental health.  Journal of 
Clinical and Consulting Psychology, 34, 1-7. 
Burman, E. (1994).  Deconstructing developmental psychology.  London: Routledge.  
Chatterjee, A. (2001).  Language and space: Some interactions.  Trends in Cognitive  
Science, 5, 55-61.  
Clark, H.H. (1969).  Linguistic processes in deductive reasoning.  Psychological  
Review, 76, 387-404. 
Clark, H.H., & Chase, W.G. (1972).  On the process of comparing sentences against  
pictures.  Cognitive Psychology, 3, 472-517.  
Clark, H. & Haviland, S. (1977). Comprehension and the given-new contract.  In R.
 Freedle (ed.), Discourse production and comprehension (pp. 1-40).  Lawrence
 Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, N.J.,. 
Crawford, M. (1995).  Talking difference: On gender and language.  London: Sage. 
Crawford, M., & Marecek, J. (1989).  Psychology reconstructs the female: 1968-1988.   
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 13, 147-165. 
Crick, N.R., Casas, J.F. & Mosher, M. (1997). Relational and overt aggression in 
preschool. Developmental Psychology, 33, 579-588. 
Danziger, K. (1990).  Constructing the subject: Historical origins of psychological  
 research.  New York: Cambridge University Press.  
DeBeauvoir, S. (1949/1972).  The second sex.  [Trans. H. M. Parshley] London:  
Penguin.  
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. (2005).  American = White?  Journal of Personality and  
 Social Psychology, 88, 447-466. 
Dyer, R. (1997).  White.  London: Routledge.  
Eagly, A. H. (1995). The science and politics of comparing women and men.  
American Psychologist, 50, 145-158.   
Eagly, A.H., & Kite, M.E. (1987).  Are stereotypes of nationalities applied to both  
women and men?  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 451-462. 
Edley, N., & Wetherell, M. (1995).  Men in perspective: Practice, power and ideology. 
 Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall.   
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1993).  Language and causation: A discursive action model of
 description and attribution.  Psychological Review, 100, 23-41. 
Favreau, O.E. (1997).  Sex and gender comparisons: Does null hypothesis testing create a
 false dichotomy?  Feminism & Psychology, 7, 63-81. 
Fedigan, L.M. (1986).  The changing role of women in models of human evolution.  
Annual Review of Anthropology, 15,  25-66. 
Fine, M., Weis, L., Powell, L.C., & Wong, L.M. (Eds.).  (1997).  Off White: readings on
 race, power, and society.  New York: Routledge.  
Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & 
G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology (pp. 357-411). Boston: McGraw-Hill. 
Foucault, M. (1970).  The order of things.  New York: Vintage. 
Freud, S. (1925/1961).  Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction  
between the sexes.  In J. Stratchey (Ed.) The standard edition of the complete  
15 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud: Volume xix, pp. 243-258.  The Hogarth 
Press: London.   
Gannon, L. (1998).  The impact of medical and sexual politics on women’s health. 
 Feminism & Psychology, 8,  285-302. 
Gannon, L., Luchetta, T., Rhodes, K., Pardie, L., & Segrist, D. (1992).  Sex bias in  
psychological research: Progress or complacency?  American Psychologist, 47, 
389-396. 
Gastil, J. (1990).  Generic pronouns and sexist language: The oxymoronic character of  
masculine generics.  Sex Roles, 23, 629-643. 
Hamilton, M.C. (1988).  Using masculine generics: Does generic He increase male
 bias in the user’s imagery?  Sex Roles, 19,  785-799. 
Hamilton, M.C. (1991).  Masculine bias in the attribution of personhood: People =  
male, male = people.  Psychology of Women Quarterly, 15, 393-402. 
Hare-Mustin, R.T., & Marecek, J. (1990).  Gender and the meaning of difference:
 Postmodernism and psychology.  In R.T. Hare-Mustin & J. Marecek (Eds.),
 Making a difference: Psychology and the construction of gender (pp. 22-64). 
 New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.  
Haslam, N. Rotschild, N. & Ernst, D. (2000).  Essentialist beliefs about social
 categories.  British Journal of Social Psychology, 39,  113-127. 
Hegarty, P. & Chryssochoou, X. (2005).  Why ‘our’ policies set the standard more  
than ‘theirs’: Category norms and generalization between European Union 
countries.  Social Cognition, 23, 491-529.    
Hegarty, P., & Pratto, F. (2001).  The effects of category norms and stereotypes on
 explanations of intergroup differences.  Journal of Personality and Social
 Psychology, 80, 723-735. 
Hegarty, P., & Pratto, F. (2004).  The differences that norms make: Empiricism, social  
constructionism and the interpretation of group differences.  Sex Roles: A Journal 
of Research, 50, 445-453. 
Hegarty, P., Pratto, F., & Lemieux, A.F. (2004).  Heterosexist ambivalence and
 heterocentric norms: Drinking in intergroup discomfort.  Group Processes and
 Intergroup Relations, 7,  119-130.  
Hegarty, P. & Ungar, S. (2006).  Preferences for order of information about gender in
 graphs.  Unpublished data: University of Surrey.  
Hill, J.H. (1999) Language, race, and White public space.  American Anthropologist, 100, 
 680-689. 
Hoffman, C. & Hurst, N. (1990).  Gender stereotypes: Perception or rationalization? 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58,  197-208. 
Hofstadter, D.R. (1985).  A person paper on purity in language.  In Metamagical themes:
 Questing for the essence of mind and pattern (pp. 159-172).  New York: Basic 
 Books.  
Hyde, J.S. (1984).  Children’s understanding of sexist language.  Developmental  
Psychology, 20, 697-706. 
Hyde, J.S. (2005).  The gender similarities hypothesis.  American Psychologist, 60, 
 581-592. 
16 
Jost, J.T. & Kruglanski, A.W. (2002).  The estrangement of social constructionism and
 experimental social psychology: History of the rift and prospects for 
 reconciliation.  Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6,  168-187. 
Kahneman, D. & Miller, D.T. (1986).  Norm theory: Comparing reality to its
 alternatives.  Psychological Review, 93, 136-153.  
Kanazawa, S. (1992).  Outcome or expectancy?  Antecedents of spontaneous causal
 attribution.  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, , 659-668. 
Kitzinger, C. (Ed.).  (1994).  Should psychologists study sex differences?  Feminism  
& Psychology, 4, 501-546.  
Kuhn, T. (1970).  The structure of scientific revolutions, Second edition.  Chicago:
 University of Chicago Press.  
Kunda, Z., Miller, D.T., & Claire, T. (1990).  Combining social concepts: The role of  
 causal reasoning.  Cognitive Science, 14,  551-577. 
Lambdin, J.R., Greer, K.M., Jibotian, K.S., Wood, K.R., & Hamilton, M.C. (2003).  The  
animal = male hypothesis: Children’s and adult’s beliefs about the sex of non
 sex-specific stuffed animals.  Sex Roles, 48, 471-482. 
Lave, J. (1988).  Cognition in practice: Mind, mathematics and culture in everyday life.  
Cambridge: Cambriduge University Press.   
Leach, C.W., Snider, N., & Iyer, A. (2002).  “Poisoning the consciences of the fortunate”:
 The experience of relative advantage and support for social equality.  In I. Walker 
 (Ed.), Relative deprivation: Specification, development and integration  (pp. 136-
 163).  New York: Cambridge University Press.   
Maass, A. & Russo, A. (2003).  Directional bias in the mental representiaton of spatial  
events: Nature or culture?  Psychological Science, 14, 296-301.   
Mahalingam, R. (2003).  Essentialism, culture and beliefs about gender among the
 Aravanis of Tamil Nadu, India.  Sex Roles, 49, 489-496. 
Martin, C.L., & Parker, S. (1995).  Folk theories about sex and race differences.  
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 45-57. 
Martyna, W. (1980).  Beyond the he/man approach.  Signs: Journal of Women in  
 Culture and Society, 5, 482-493.  
McGuire, W. (1973).  The yin and yan of progress in social psychology.  Journal of
 Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 446-456. 
McHugh, M., Koeske, R.D., & Frieze, I.N. (1986).  Issues to consider in conducting  
non-sexist psychological research.  American Psychologist, 41, 879-889. 
McIntosh, P. (1998).  White privilege: Unpacking the invisible knapsack.  In M.
 McGoldrick (Ed.), Revisioning family therapy: Race, culture, and gender in
 clinical practices (pp. 147-152).  New York: Guildford Press.  
Mednick, M.T. (1989).  On the politics of psychological constructs: Stop the  
 bandwagon, I want to get off.  American Psychologist, 44, 1118-1123. 
Miller, D.T., & Prentice, D.A. (1996).  The construction of social norms and standards.  
In E.T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of 
basic principles (pp. 799-829).  New York: Guildford.   
Miller, D.T., Taylor, B., & Buck, M.L. (1991).  Gender gaps: who needs to be  
explained?  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 5-12. 
Moyer, R. (1997).  Covering gender on memory’s front page: Men’s prominence and
 women’s prospects.  Sex Roles, 37,  595-618. 
17 
Ng, S.H. (1990).  Androcentric coding of man and his in memory by language users. 
 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 455-464. 
Oyama, S. (2000).  The ontogeny of information: Developmental systems and evolution.  
Duke University Press: Durham, NC. 
Parks, J.B. & Robertson, M.A. (2004).  Attitudes toward women mediate the gender  
effect on attitudes toward sexist language.  Psychology of Women Quarterly, 28, 
233-239. 
Petersen, A. (1998).  Sexing the body: Representations of sex differences in Gray’s
 Anatomy, 1858 to the present.  Body & Society, 4, 1-15. 
Popper,K. (1959).  The logic of scientific discovery.  New York: Basic Books.  
Potter, J. & Wetherell, M. (1987).  Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes
 and behaviour.  London: Sage.    
Powell, A.A., Branscombe, N.R., & Schmitt, M.T. (2005).  Inequality as ingroup
 privilege or outgroup disadvantage: The impact of group focus on collective guilt
 and interracial attitudes.  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 508
 521. 
Pratto, F., Hegarty, P. & Korchmairos, J. (in press).   Who gets stereotyped?  How
 communication practices and category norms lead people to stereotype particular
 people and groups.   To appear in Y. Kashima, K. Fiedler, & P. Freytag (Eds.),
 Stereotype dynamics: Language-based approaches to stereotype formation,
 maintenance, and change. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Pratto, F., Korchmaros, J. N., & Hegarty, P. (in press).  When race and gender go without
 saying.  Social Cognition. 
Prentice, D.A. (1994).  Do language reforms change our way of thinking?  Journal of
 Language and Social Psychology, 13, 3-19. 
Rothblum, E. D. (1988).  More on reporting sex differences.  American Psychologist, 43,
 1095. 
Scarr, S. (1988).  Race and gender as psychological variables: Social and ethical  
issues.  American Psychologist, 43, 56-59. 
Sedgwick, E.K. (1990).  Epistemology of the closet.  Berkeley, CA: University of
 California Press.  
Shah, P., & Hoeffner, J. (2002).  Review of graph comprehension research: Implications
 for instruction.  Educational Psychology Review, 14, 47-69. 
Shah, P., Mayer, R., & Hegarty, M. (1999).  Graphs as aids to knowledge construction:
 Signaling techniques for guiding the process of graph comprehension.  Journal of
 Educational Psychology, 91, 690-702. 
Silveira, J. (1980).  Generic masculine words and thinking.  N C. Kramarae (Ed.), The
 voices and words of women and men (pp. 165-178).  Oxford: Pergammon.  
Snyder, M., & Swann, W.B. (1978).  Hypothesis-testing porcesses in social interaction.
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1202-1212. 
Spalek, T.M. & Hammad, S. (2005).  The left-to-right bias in inhibition of return is
 due to the direction of reading.  Psychological Science, 16, 15-18. 
Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M., & Quinn, D.M. (1999).  Stereotype threat and women’s  
 math performance.  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 4-28.    
18 
Stahlberg, D., Sczesny, S., & Braun, F. (2001).  Name your favourite musician: Effects of
 masculine generics and their alternatives in German.  Journal of Language and
 Social Psychology, 20,  464-469. 
Steele, C.M. (1997).  A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity  
 and performance.  American Psychologist, 52, 613-629. 
Stroessner, S. J. (1996). Social categorization by race or sex: Effects of perceived  
 non-normalcy on response times. Social Cognition, 14, 247–276. 
Swim, J.K., Mallett, R., & Stangor, C. (2004).  Understanding subtle sexism: Detection
 and use of sexist language.  Sex Roles, 51, 117-128.  
Tiefer, L. (1991).  A brief history of the Association for Women in Psychology: 1969
 1991.  Psychology of Women Quarterly, 15, 635-649. 
Tversky, B., Kugelman, S. & Winter, A. (1991).  Cross-cultural and developmental  
trends in graphic productions.  Cognitive Psychology, 23, 515-557. 
Walsh, R. (1989).  Do research reports in mainstream feminist psychology journals
 reflect feminist values?  Psychology of Women Quarterly, 13, 433-444. 
Wason, P. C. (1960).  On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task.   
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 129-140. 
Willig, M.A. (1985).  Metatheoretical dilemmas in the psychology of gender.  American
 Psychologist, 40, 800-811.  
Zachs, J.,  & Tversky, B. (1999).  Bars and lines: A study of graphic communication.  
Memory and Cognition, 27,  1073-1079. 
Zárate, M., & Smith, E.E. (1990).  Person categorization and stereotyping.  Social  
 Cognition, 8,  161-185.  
 
  
19 
Table 3.   Number of Abstracts Containing ‘More Than’ and ‘Less Than’ Constructions of  
Gender Differences Using Each Gender Group as the Background of the Comparison. 
            
Comparative Phrase “more than” “less than” Total (%) χ2   
Background Term. 
     Wom?n  3916  82  3998 (65.5)   
     M?n  2083  24  2107 (34.5) 292.86*** 
     Female*  5670  72  5732 (56.2) 
     Male*  4416  44  4460 (43.8) 158.75*** 
     Boy*  1833  37  1870 (56.4) 
     Girl*   1429  19  1448 (43.6) 53.67*** 
     Mother*  296  98   394 (47.4) 
     Father*  430  8  438 (52.6) .96 n.s.   
***p<.001, n.s. = non-significant.   
Note: For each pair of terms, Psychinfo was searched for abstracts including the relevant 
comparative phrase adjacent to the relevant background term (e.g., more adj than adj 
wom?n) and the compliment of that term (e.g., m?n).  On the Psychinfo data base, the 
operator “*” allows for any completion of the term.  For example, a search for mother* 
will yield articles including such words as mother, mothers, and motherhood.  The 
operator “?” will search for words that include any letter in that position. Thus, a search 
for wom?n will yield articles including the words woman and women.  The term adj 
limits the search to abstracts that include the words only when they are adjacent to each 
other.   
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Figure 1: Mean Number of References to Females and Males by Salience of Gender  
Differences in Articles’ Text 
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